Prat, just like that, not feigning any diplomacy and uncompromising about the conclusions drawn from his weeklong stay in Pakistan, my uncle exhibits a demeanor reflective of someone unhappy with an erring child who has gone too far in taking many privileges for granted. Last time he was here, he stayed in Daska, a small town in Sialkot that my Nanaabbu made home in 1948 as he left family and business behind to start a new life in the “azad” Pakistan. Daska is very close to the border and that’s what my grandfather and many of his generation who settled in this very "Kashmiri" city in Punjab, lived and most have now died, hoping would help them maintain contact with their hometowns. That azadi that they expected would come in 1948, didn’t come. If at all he had any regrets about his decision to settle in Pakistan, he never showed it. He raised thoroughly Pakistani kids and that’s the kind of “Pakistani nationalism” he relayed to his relatives in Kashmir too.
My uncle’s unable to comprehend the contrast between Pakistan’s hapless national affairs and the showy sophistication of the urban masses. A consistent comment on my sister’s wedding pics was, “ …muslims don’t do this in Kashmir, it’s a hindu practice” (from the garlands to stage decorations and “doodh pillai” to the ever so gaudy glitter of the ceremony itself- n let me clarify from a Pakistani perspective it was any usual wedding, leaning in fact towards the simpler of ceremonies in Islamabad), a comment reflective probably more of the insecurity felt by minorities which leads to an adamant commitment to perceived religious and “national” values as appears to be the state of muslims atleast in Indian side of Kashmir, than an educated denunciation of “alien” practices adopted by a Muslim Pakistan. However, his comments about how one can “see” a lot more money in Pakistan than 26 years ago, the affluence of Islamabad compared to Delhi and yet many more beggars too on the street than last time was definitely a sincere reflection on the rich-poor divide in Pakistan . He was concerned about the extravagance on display, for it didn’t set down well with the beggar of a country that we have turned into, and more importantly the shriveled spectacle that we present today of the messianic warrior state the Kashmiris have always looked upto expectantly. This disappointment was reflected in his response to my question about the Kashmiri aspiration in today’s geopolitical atmosphere, particularly of the Kashmiri youth. He said while any sympathy for India was completely lost on the Kashmiri muslims, from the partition generation to the current lot who have been witness to Pakistan’s u-turns in their most glaring form, their association with Pakistan depended on the way we conducted ourselves. And with that he added an endnote: You just take care of Pakistan, Kashmiris will continue to search for inspiration in their ideological affinity with Pakistan.
And then there was a list of things he wanted to be taken care of in Pakistan. He wanted us to take care of the waderas we elect into office and who continue to suck us dry and deposit all the hard earned money of the electorate in their private accounts outside Pakistan. He wanted us to take care of the frustration permeating our society, show a little more dedication to Pakistan and not run away to leave it at the mercy of money-mints. He wanted care to be taken of the leadership vacuum in this country. He wanted us to take care of the traitors that pose as leaders and sell the country’s secrets to roll back a concerted initiative to wrest control of Indian Kashmir (reference to Khalistan movement and Benazir’s alleged admission of Pakistan’s involvement and handing over of dossiers consisting of state secrets)-an example I state here not because of the merit of his argument but only so as to present the dissatisfaction at the inconsistency of the Pakistan government’s strategy vis-a vis the Kashmir issue, and the feeling of having been left high and dry just when a climax is reached on some of Pakistan’s more ambitious strategic designs. He cited also the shift in positions from an independent Kashmir as first put forward by Zia-ul Haq, which according to him presented a more realistic chance of ridding the Kashmiris of the yoke of Indian occupation. He felt that since independence was a diversion from Pakistan’s traditional stance of the state’s accession, it would be more acceptable to the national ego of the Indian administration than the plausible results of a strictly U.N. resolution defined referendum. And then worse-comes-to worst, Musharraf’s highly charged declarations defending kashmiris’ right to self determination in Agra coming to naught when he made his Chenab-formula (division of Jammu and Kashmir along the Chenab river) proposal public, reneging on Pakistan’s commitment to the U.N. resolutions. Or for that matter, the common Kashmiri’s bewilderment at the Pakistan government’s outright denunciation of militant activity after having supported it for more than a decade and in the process shunning erstwhile popular Kashmiri leadership of the likes of Syed Ali Gilani. That’s what some Kashmiris reminded my father when my parents went over to the Indian camp during haj in 2001 to meet my mother’s relative, “aap nai tau hamari peeth mai khanjar ghonp dia hai” (you-Pakistan- have/has stabbed us in the back).
All the admonition and criticism however was not coming as a judgment from an outsider. It was more like a regretful narration of one’s own shortcomings, coming from someone forcefully ripped away from the whole. And interestingly unlike us in Pakistan, who have played around with our independence and the values that were part of the dream of Pakistan, like some cheap toy and shown contentment with an elite-centric status qou as long as its fallouts don’t knock at our doorsteps, Kashmiris are not content with peace imposed at the stake of justice. It cannot erase for them the reality of graveyards brimming with the future that Kashmir was to have; the past that weighs very heavily against a “peaceful” status qou. It was a plea for us to mend our ways, lest some great harm comes to Pakistan, which for them still represents an ideal of muslim nationhood, an aspiration that they haven’t experienced as yet and still want to look upto-just like the complaining Kashmiri professor who wept as he kissed my father’s hand when he heard he was from Pakistan and said, “You are very lucky; you come from a free country.” And they do NOT want this ideal to be mutilated to an extent where the 60 years long anticipation is rendered baseless. This is probably why in 1971, as my mother narrates, on the announcement of General Niazi’s surrender in Dhaka, my grandfather rushed home, took out his prayer mat and knelt in front of God weeping uncontrollably in supplication for some miracle to undo the blot on the dream he had followed, into Pakistan.
Footnote: This article does not claim to represent the aspirations of the population of Jammu and Kashmir. Nor does it intend to pass a definite statement on the political conflict itself. It is more a reflection on the development of this conflict and the human side of it over its 60 years long history, and on the state of Pakistan itself.
-Asma
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